A Test of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing by Alberto F. Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









We thank Shamena Anwar, Abhijit Banerjee, Katherine Barnes, Francesco Corielli, Richard Dieter,
John Donohue, Jeffry Fagan, James MacKinnon, Nicola Persico, Andrei Shleifer and seminar participants
at CIAR, Duke, Warwick, Royal Holloway, IIES Stockholm University, Queen's University, NBER
Political Economy Conference, CEPR Public Policy Conference and Villa La Pietra Conference on
New Directions in Applied Microeconomics for helpful comments. Giulia La Mattina, Lucia Rizzica,
Erika Deserranno, Mariagiovanna Di Feo, Damiano Briguglio, Giovanni Rizzo, Matteo Fiorini and
Marta Barazzetta provided excellent research assistance. This paper was written while Alesina was
visiting IGIER Bocconi.  He thanks this institution for hospitality.  La Ferrara acknowledges financial
support from the European Research Council grant ERC-2007-StG-208661. The usual disclaimer applies.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2011 by Alberto F. Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
© notice, is given to the source.A Test of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing
Alberto F. Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara




This paper proposes a test of racial bias in capital sentencing based upon patterns of judicial errors
in lower courts. We model the behavior of the trial court as minimizing a weighted sum of the probability
of sentencing an innocent and that of letting a guilty defendant free.  We define racial bias as a situation
where the relative weight on the two types of errors is a function of defendant and/or victim race. The
key prediction of the model is that if the court is unbiased, ex post the error rate should be independent
of the combination of defendant and victim race.  We test this prediction using an original dataset
that contains the race of the defendant and of the victim(s) for all capital appeals that became final
between 1973 and 1995. We find robust evidence of bias against minority defendants who killed white
victims: In Direct Appeal and Habeas Corpus the probability of error in these cases is 3 and 9 percentage
















One of the arguments against the death penalty in the United States is that it is applied
with a racial bias against minorities. Consider for example the following statement, taken
from the opening paragraph of a document by one of the most vocal organizations opposing
capital punishment:
“African Americans are disproportionately represented among people condemned
to death in the USA. While they make up 12 per cent of the national popula-
tion, they account for more than 40 per cent of the country’s current death row
inmates, and one in three of those executed since 1977.”1
While factually correct, statements like these can hardly be interpreted as evidence of
racial bias because violent crime rates are higher amongst minorities than whites. Account-
ing for diﬀerences in patterns of crime, and more generally in unobservables that may be
correlated with race, is crucial if one wants to rigorously test for racial bias. We propose
a test of racial bias in capital sentencing that allows for the possibility that members of
diﬀerent racial groups diﬀer along observable and unobservable dimensions.
We develop a model where courts minimize the probability of making judicial errors and
we derive a simple test for racial bias. Our test builds on the following insight. Even if we
do not observe in the data all the elements that trial courts consider when imposing a death
verdict, if these courts are unbiased, ex post they should not end up making judicial errors
more frequently in cases involving certain combinations of defendant and victim’s race. We
exploit a feature of the capital sentencing process in the US, namely that all ﬁrst degree
capital sentences are automatically appealed, and we focus upon errors of ﬁrst degree courts
reversed by higher courts. Our test rests on the assumption that superior courts can only
improve upon the accuracy of ﬁrst sentencing and therefore remove part or all racial bias.
Our model allows for the possibility that racial groups diﬀer in their propensity to com-
mit crimes, in the quality of legal assistance they have access to, and in other unobserved
dimensions. This implies that a simple test comparing errors in judgements against minor-
ity defendants with errors against white defendants is inconclusive, as diﬀerences in error
rates may reﬂect diﬀerences in unobservables that are correlated with defendants’ race. On
the other hand, if we assume that for given defendant’s race the distribution of these un-
observables does not vary with the race of the victim, we can build a test based on pairs
of victim/defendant races.2 O u rt e s tr e l i e su p o nt h ei d e at h a tt h er a n k i n go fﬁrst degree
mistakes depending upon these pairs should not violate certain patterns that are consistent
with unbiased courts. For example, if courts commit more errors on minority defendants who
killed white victims than on those who killed non-white victims, they should also commit
more errors on white defendants who killed white victims than on those who killed non-white
ones. In other words, for each defendant’s race the ranking of error rates across victims’ race
must be the same. Failure to satisfy this condition implies the presence of racial bias in our
model.
In order to implement this test we embarked on a challenging data collection exercise. We
started from the data on capital appeals assembled by Liebman, Fagan and West (2000) for
1Amnesty International, USA Death by Discrimination - The Continuiung Role of Race in Capital Cases,
April 2003, p.1.
2Remember that the death penalty applies almost exlusively to homicides so there is always at least one
well identiﬁed victim.
2the period 1973-1995 and we supplemented it with information collected on a case by case
basis. An especially diﬃcult variable to reconstruct was the race of the victim for each case
(neither defendant’s nor victim’s race are available in Liebman et al.’s data). As a result,
our study is the ﬁrst to provide even descriptive information on the racial composition of
victims in capital cases for the entire US in the period under study. As we report below,
51 percent of defendants in the ﬁrst stage of appeal are white and 41 percent are African
American. On the other hand, 78 percent of these cases involve at least one white victim,
and 17 percent at least one African American victim.
When we implement our test we ﬁnd results consistent with the presence of racial preju-
dice: ceteris paribus, ﬁrst degree courts are more severe (i.e., they tend to give more death
sentences which are then reversed) against cases involving a minority defendant killing one
or more white victims. This result holds strong both for the cases that reach the ﬁnal stage
of revisions and appeal, the Habeas Corpus stage in Federal Courts, and for the full sample
of cases in the ﬁrst appeal stage, called Direct Appeal. For Habeas Corpus cases involving a
minority defendant, the error rate was 375 percent if the victim was white, and 284 percent
if it was not white, with a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence of 9 percentage points. For cases
involving a white defendant the diﬀerence indicates higher reversal rates when the victim is
non-white, but it is not signiﬁcant. In the Direct Appeal sample, cases involving a minority
defendant had an error rate of 377 percent if the victim was white and 347 percent if the
victim was a minority, with a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence of 3 percentage points. In
cases involving a white defendant the diﬀerence is again in the opposite direction and not
signiﬁcant. This pattern of results is consistent with racial bias according to our rank order
test.
When we disaggregate the results by region, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect is driven by Southern
States. The diﬀerence in error rates in these States is large: in Habeas Corpus cases, the error
rate is 155 percentage points higher for minority defendants with white victims as compared
to minority defendants with non-white victims (p-value 01) For the Direct Appeal sample
the corresponding diﬀerence is 33 percentage points (p-value 13).
The validity of our test relies upon several assumptions. The ﬁrst is an assumption
about the behavior of the higher courts. If these courts are unbiased and make mistakes
uncorrelated with the race of defendant and victim our tests are exactly speciﬁed. If higher
courts are also racially biased in the same direction of the lower courts but less so, our test
underestimates t h ea m o u n to fr a c i a lb i a so fﬁrst degree courts. Our test would overestimate
the level of bias if higher courts actively discriminated in favor of minority defendants who
killed white victims.3 Note that our test would not fail if higher courts simply discriminated
in favor of minorities, say because of lower quality of their legal counsel: to invalidate our test
the “reverse discrimination” should be targeting very speciﬁcally the minority defendant/
white victim pair. We assess the plausibility of this interpretation empirically, exploiting
diﬀerences in ideology across appeal courts. We build upon the premise that the judges who
would be most likely to reverse discriminate in favor of minority defendants who killed white
victims would be those more “left leaning”. Using various measures of political orientation
of higher courts’ judges we do not ﬁnd any evidence of this eﬀect. Both left wing and right
wing leaning judges exhibit the same pattern of reversal of ﬁrst degree sentences: higher
reversal for minority defendants who killed white victims compared to those who killed non-
3See Argys and Mocan (2004) on the issue of reverse discrimination in executions and sentence commu-
tations.
3w h i t ev i c t i m s ,b u tn o ts of o rw h i t ed e f e n d a n t sw h ok i l l e dw h i t ev i c t i m sc o m p a r e dt ow h i t e
defendants who killed non-white victims.
Another assumption upon which our test rests is that possible unobservable characteris-
tics, such as characteristics of the crime or quality of the evidence, are not systematically
diﬀerent across victims’ races, for given defendant’s race. To assess the plausibility of this
assumption, we investigate whether our results are driven by observable characteristics of
the crime or of the trial which diﬀer between defendant-victim pairs, s u c ha st h et y p eo f
crime (e.g., robberies versus other crimes), the characteristics of the victim (gender, number,
status in the community) and the quality of legal counsel. We do not ﬁnd any evidence of
this.
Our test is related to those developed in the literature on racial bias in motor vehicle
searches and in particular to recent work by Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001), Anwar
and Fang (2006) and Antonovics and Knight (2009). However, our model diﬀers from
those papers in several ways. In models of car searches the issue is which car to stop
and then with certainty either contraband is found or not. In our model the courts have
to evaluate guilt or innocence based on a noisy signal and there is a review of the ﬁrst
decision. Guilt or innocence cannot be decided for sure like in a car search. The objective
function of our courts is therefore diﬀerent from that of a trooper stopping cars, in that it
trades oﬀ the extent of type I and type II errors.4 We share with Gennaioli and Shleifer
(2007) an interest in the eﬀect of bias in judges’ decisions. These authors however address
ad i ﬀerent research question, namely how common law and the accumulation of precedents
leads towards an equilibrium without judicial bias. We do not pursue this type of dynamic
analysis of bias. Abrams, Bertrand and Mullainathan (forthcoming) empirically test whether
there are systematic diﬀerences across judges in the racial gap in sentencing for felony crimes
and exploit the random assignment of cases to judges in one county in Illinois. This type
of random variation is not available for death penalty cases, so our test is built on diﬀerent
grounds, exploiting a prediction on the equilibrium behavior of the court.
Our paper is also related to the literature on the death sentence and its usefulness. We do
not touch upon the question of the deterrence eﬀect of the death penalty and we focus only
on the question of whether or not the death penalty is applied with a racial bias.5 There are
several early contributions in the law literature on the role played by race in capital sentencing
and execution. The stylized facts described in this literature include: (i) the disproportionate
execution of blacks compared to whites; and (ii) the higher likelihood that the death penalty
is imposed when the victim is white. Most of these studies rely on small samples and can
p o t e n t i a l l yb ec r i t i c i z e do nt h eg r o u n d st h a ti m p o r t a n tf a c t o r sa ﬀecting the decision of the
c o u r tm a yn o tb eo b s e r v a b l ei nt h ed a t a .T h i si sa l m o s ti n e v i t a b l yt h ec a s ew h e nad i r e c t
test of discrimination at the sentencing stage is attempted. Even the most comprehensive
data source, in fact, will not possibly include all the information that was available to the
c o u r ta tt h em o m e n tw h e nt h es e n t e n c ew a si m p o s e d . O n eo ft h em o s ti n ﬂuential early
attempts at controlling for observable factors is a study by Gross and Mauro (1984). They
constructed an index of aggravating factors and found that, after controlling for them, the
race of the victim was still a strong predictor of capital sentencing (the likelihood of a death
4Both our paper and the literature of motor vehicle searches owe a lot to the path-breaking work by
Becker (1957) on rational models of crime.
5On this point see among others, Erlich (1975), Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich (2003) and Donohue III
and Wolfers (2005) for a review.
4sentence being higher when the victim was white), but the race of the defendant had no
residual explanatory power. Blume, Eisenberg and Wells (2004) combine data on death row
cases for eight US States with homicide data for the same States over the period 1976-1998
and ﬁnd that murders involving black defendants and white victims are signiﬁcantly more
likely to result in death sentences than white defendant-white victim murders. On the other
hand, they ﬁnd that black defendant-black victim cases are signiﬁcantly under-represented
on death row. Compared to this literature, our test is not subject to the omitted variable
bias critique (under the assumption of the model). At the same time, our test has a more
limited scope, in that it applies to cases that have received the death sentence in the ﬁrst
trial, and cannot estimate bias occurring from exclusion errors, i.e. cases that should have
received a death sentence and did not.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 oﬀers a brief synthesis of the institutional
details useful to understand judicial errors in capital cases in the US.6 Section 3 describes
our model of behavior of Courts and defendants and derives our test of racial bias. Section
4 describes the data. Section 5 presents our empirical methodology and results. The last
section concludes.
2 History and institutional background
2.1 A brief history of the death penalty in the US
We can identify four periods of the history of capital punishment in the US: from the arrival
of the Pilgrim to the Civil War, from the Civil War to the second world war, from 1945 to
1972 and from 1976 to today. In the preC i v i lW a r sp e r i o dt h e r ew e r es i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerences in
the application of the death penalty in the Northern Colonies (and then states) and Southern
colonies (and then states). In the North the death penalty was applied to murder, treason
a few other violent crimes and several religious transgressions like witchcraft, blasphemy,
idolatry and acts of sodomy. In the South in addition to those crimes the death penalty
served the purpose of enforcing the slave system and therefore was prescribed for slave
stealing and (especially) the organization or instigation of slaves against owners. In addition
a Black Code enlisted crimes punishable with death for black defendants but not whites.
T h em o s th e i n o u so ft h o s ew a st h er a p eo faw h i t ew o m a nb yab l a c km a n . A f t e rt h ec i v i l
war the Black Code was abolished but in the South the application of the death penalty
implicitly continued to follow the guidelines of this code. This is quite suggestive for the
evidence we present below.
After the Second World war there was a steady decline in executions. The last execution
conducted before the Supreme Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional was in
Colorado in 1967. In Furman v. Georgia in 1972, the Supreme Court reversed all existing
death sentences and capital statutes as unconstitutional. The ruling of the Court held
that the administration of capital punishment at the time violated the eighth amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. All the Justices in the majority motivated
their decision relying on the arbitrary and/or discriminatory nature of the death penalty as
implemented by existing statutes. Starting the following year, new death penalty statutes
were written, and in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the Court allowed capital punishment to
6Section 2 largely draws on Coyne and Enzeroth (2006).
5resume.7 The statutes that were deemed constitutional typically contained explicit lists of
aggravating and mitigating factors that should guide the decisions of the juries and reduce
the extent of discretion. The death penalty is currently allowed only for treason or murder
implying therefore a much narrower deﬁnition of capital crimes relative to previous historical
periods.
2.2 Procedures
Today, thirty-ﬁve states in the US allow capital punishment.8 Each state has its own statute
but much similarity exists among them. Most statutes are in fact modelled around the
Georgia one approved by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia in 1976. That statute
prescribed: a) an independent trial of guilt or innocence; b) a second hearing solely to
determine the sentence; c) a ﬁnding of at least one aggravating circumstance; d) an automatic
review by the Georgia Supreme Court and e) the comparison to similar cases. Even though
the statutes are similar, the actual application of the death penalty varies greatly across
states.
First trial and sentencing
Trials for capital crimes embed two stages: the guilt phase, where the jury deliberates
whether the defendant is guilty or not, and the sentencing stage where, if the defendant is
found guilty, the jury (or in some States and until 2002, the judge) weighs the aggravating and
mitigating factors presented by the prosecutor and the defense and determines the sentence.
The Supreme Court has ruled that no statute can prescribe mandatory capital punishment,
that is no one found guilty of a capital crime can be automatically sentenced to death.9
This implies that the jury always has discretion in choosing between a death sentence or
imprisonment, if the defendant is found guilty. A death sentence requires the existence of
at least one aggravating circumstance and the consideration of applicable mitigating factors.
What constitutes both vary from State to State. Certain aggravating circumstances or
mitigating factors are very clear, like killing a police oﬃcer (aggravating) or killing under a
certain age (mitigating). But other factors are much less clear cut, like a murder being “in
cold blood and pitiless” (aggravating) or “acting under duress” (mitigating). The Supreme
Court has struggled with unclear and vague deﬁnitions of aggravating circumstances and
mitigating factors but quite a large latitude remains. About one per cent of the murders
committed in a year ends up in a death sentence.10
The appeal process
The most important aspect of the capital punishment procedural rules for the purpose of our
study is that all capital sentences, with no exceptions, are automatically appealed in state
7In reality since 1972 Utah and Florida had already reinstated death penalty statutes and many states
did not stop sentencing defendants. By 1976, 460 individuals had been sentenced to death across diﬀerent
states.
8The Federal Government has two death penalty statues on for the military and the other for non military
crimes.
9Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana (1976).
10See Barnes, Sloss and Thaman (2008) for a recent discussion of criteria according to which prosecutors
purse the death penalty in about 4 percent of capital crimes in Missouri.
6high courts. In all but two states the appeal runs directly from the trial court to the state
supreme court, while in Alabama and Ohio it goes through an intermediate court of criminal
appeals before reaching the highest court. Sentences that survive state direct appeals are
then inspected by state post-conviction courts and, if they survive this stage too they can
be reviewed in federal habeas corpus petitions. The process often lasts several years. At
each stage, the appeal court can overturn the sentence if “serious error” is found, i.e. “error
that substantially undermines the reliability of the guilt ﬁnding or death sentence imposed
at trial” (Liebman et al., 2000). When all appeals are exhausted, the only hope left for the
defendant is an act of clemency from the State Governor.
Liebman, Fagan and West (2000) conducted a study of all 4,578 state capital appeals
in the period 1973-1995, plus 248 state post conviction reversals and 599 capital sentences
reviewed by federal habeas corpus courts in the same period. Their ﬁndings were striking:
between 1973 and 1995, the proportion of fully reviewed capital judgments in which “serious
error” was found and which were overturned at one of the three stages was 68 percent.
This is what happened to overturned cases at retrial: 7 percent were found to be innocent,
75 percent were resentenced to less than death, and 18 percent were resentenced to death.
These sentence reversals will play a key role in our empirical test.
3 The model
3.1 The setup
We consider a defendant whom a court can condemn to the death penalty or to a lesser
penalty. If the court decides for the death penalty, there is an appeal. In case of a lesser
sentence or a no guilt verdict there is no appeal and the decision stands. In appeal, the
superior court can either conﬁrm the death penalty or reverse the decision of the lower
court because of errors. An error can occur in establishing the guilt of the defendant or
in sentencing the death penalty for a crime that did not warrant it. Our assumption (to
be discussed below) is that while the lower courts can make mistakes, higher courts make
no mistakes. Our empirical test holds identically under the more general assumption that
even the highest courts can make mistakes but these are uncorrelated with the race of the
defendant and of the victim.
We assume that each crime involves one defendant and one victim. Defendants are char-
acterized by their race and by a set of characteristics of the person or the crime or the
relationship between the person and crime. Let  ∈ {} b et h er a c eo ft h ed e f e n d a n t ,
where  stands for “white” and  for “minority”. Let’s deﬁn et h er a c eo ft h ev i c t i ma s
 ∈ {}. The court observes several signals over the characteristics of the defendant
and of the crime and summarizes them in a single dimension which we denote with  and
that we can think of as the evidence. We normalize the support of  so that [01] The
distribution of evidence can depend upon the race of the defendant, for instance because
of the quality of his/her legal assistance: if minority defendants (on average poorer) have a
lower quality defense, they may carry a less precise signal and face more errors against them
in the ﬁrst trials.11 While the quality of defense is not explicitly modeled in our framework,
11Results by Iyengar (2007) indeed suggest that this may be the case. When comparing the eﬀectiveness
of two types of defense lawyers provided for indigent defendants, namely public defenders or court private
lawyers compensated by the hours, she ﬁnds that the former perform better and minority defendants are
7i tc a nb ei n c o r p o r a t e di nad i ﬀerent distribution of evidence faced by the courts for minority
and white defendants. Thus we allow 
 () and 
 () to depend on the race of the defen-
dant. We assume that the signal is informative for the court and the densities 
() and

() satisfy the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP), that is:
MLRP: 
()
() is strictly increasing in ,f o r ∈ {}.
Intuitively, this property implies that higher values of the signal  are associated with a
relatively higher probability of guilt. We also assume 
()
() −→ +∞ as  −→ 1.
The court chooses to sentence the defendant to death if the evidence is above a certain
threshold. We deﬁne the threshold , which as indicated in the notation could vary with
the race of the defendant and of the victim, allowing the court to choose four potentially
diﬀerent thresholds. The probability than an individual or race  killing an individual of
race  is sentenced to death is:  ()=P r(  > ).
3.1.1 The problem of the potential criminal
An individual considering whether to commit a capital crime (crime in short) compares the
costs and beneﬁts of it. The beneﬁt of committing the crime and getting away with it is
0; think of it as the money stolen from a bank (with a killing during the robbery) or the
pleasure of killing an enemy. The cost of being sentenced to death having committed the
crime is   0. The cost of being sentenced to death not having committed the crime is ,
with 0    .12 All of the above ,  and  are public information.
For an individual the cost of committing a crime, which may include the moral cost,
is  and it is drawn from a distribution =() with support in R+. The court knows the
distribution but not the realization of  which is known only to the individual. We allow the
distribution of costs to diﬀer across races, thus allowing a higher propensity of minorities to
commit crimes.
The individual chooses whether to commit a crime taking into account the likelihood of
being convicted and takes  as given since it is chosen by the court.
In certain types of crimes the defendant cannot choose the victim and therefore his or her
race. One example is a bank robbery with the killing of guards, whose race was unknown to
the criminals ex ante. In a second type of crime the defendant wants to kill, say, a relative,
in which case he also cannot choose the race of the victim but the race of the victim is known
ex ante. In a third type of crime the defendant can choose the race of the victim, say in a
rape with murder. For expositional simplicity we present the second case in the text and the
ﬁr s ta n dt h i r di nt h eA p p e n d i x .
The expected payoﬀ from the crime for an individual with race  and a certain realization








 ()[ − ]
The ﬁrst term represents the cost of being convicted, the second term the beneﬁt of getting
away with the crime. The expected payoﬀ from not committing that crime is:
disproportionately represented by the latter.
12Remember that by assumption there are no mistakes in the ﬁnal ruling of higher courts, therefore no














 +[ 1− 

 ()] ≡ 
∗() (1)
Thus ∗ () is the threshold of individual cost  below which an individual of race 






as the probability of guilt, i.e. the probability that the realization of  is low enough so that
a crime is committed. Note that if the court applied a diﬀerent standard of proof depending
on the race of the victim, e.g.    then potential criminals would internalize that
and ceteris paribus we would observe fewer crimes involving  pairs than  pairs.
3.1.2 The problem of the court
T h ec o u r tw a n t st os e n t e n c eg u i l t yd e f e n d a n t st ot h ed e a t hp e n a l t y ,b u tw a n t st oa v o i dt h e
mistakes of sentencing innocent defendants. Note that under the assumption that the higher
courts never make mistakes the costs of sentencing an innocent for the lower courts are the
moral costs of inﬂicting high costs () to innocent defendants and the costs of reputation
losses of having made mistakes.13 These considerations can be summarized by assuming that
the court minimizes a weighted average of the probability of condemning an innocent (type I
error) and the probability of letting a guilty person free (type II error). Therefore the court















0    1
for  ∈ {} and  ∈ {} The ﬁrst and second term in (3) are, respectively, the type
I and type II error. The parameter  represents the relative weight given by the court to
type I error and will be crucial for deﬁning our test of racial bias.
The optimal decision of the court in a case involving a defendant of race  and a victim
of race  is to impose a death sentence if and only if the signal  exceeds the threshold ∗
















The cutoﬀ value ∗
 is thus the “standard of proof” applied by the court. Inspection of (4)
immediately reveals that ∗
 is increasing in , i.e. the higher the relative concern about
condemning an innocent, the higher will be the standard of proof required before imposing
a death sentence.
13In the more general version of the model in which even superior courts can actually make mistakes,
although uncorrelated with race, lower courts also have to worry about the possibility that innocent people
sentenced to death are never released, which implies a very high moral cost.









By Brouwer’s ﬁxed point theorem an equilibrium exists. The proof of uniqueness is in the
Appendix. Note that even if  =  for any  the equilibrium cutoﬀ point chosen by
the court can be, and in general will be, diﬀerent for white and minority defendants. In fact
the left hand side of (4) depends on the race of the defendant, , because 
 and 
 depend
on ; and the right hand side of (4) depend on  because the distribution of the cost of
committing a crime = (and hence )d e p e n d so n For example, if minorities have a lower
cost of committing crimes, ceteris paribus the court will choose ∗
  ∗
. On the other
hand, under the assumptions of our model the only way the race of the victim  can enter
(4) is through the parameter . This is the key insight upon which our test is based.
3.2 A test of racial bias
In our model a court could be biased in diﬀerent ways.
Deﬁnition 1 Bias only on the race of the defendant:  = ()
In this case  depends upon the race of the defendant (), but not the race of the victim
(). A bias against minority defendants is represented by  =    = ,a s
the court places less weight on the possibility of wrongly condemning a minority defendant.
Deﬁnition 2 Bias only on the race of the victim:  = ()
In this case  depends on the race of the victim (), but not on the race of the defendant
(). A bias in favor of white victims is represented by  =    = ,a st h e
court places less weight on the possibility of wrongly condemning someone who has killed a
white victim.
Deﬁnition 3 Bias on both the race of the victim () and the race of the defendant ():
 = ()
This is a situation where the court applies a diﬀerential treatment on the basis of the
race of the victim, but it further diﬀerentiates depending on who has killed that victim.
For example, a situation where the court treats minority defendants who have killed white
victims more harshly than whites who have killed whites, but is relatively lenient on both if
the victim is non-white, can be represented as:      = 































10with () given by (6). As shown in the Appendix, under MLRP () is monotonically
decreasing in ∗
: the higher the standard of proof, the lower the error rate.
The parameter  enters the error rate (7) through the optimal threshold ∗
 derived
from (4), allowing us to build a test. The race of the victim  only aﬀects ∗
 if  depends
on . In fact in the equilibrium condition (4) the left hand side does not depend on 
nor does the second term on the right hand side, so (1−) is the only term through
which  could aﬀect the equilibrium threshold ∗
 and consequently the error rate. On
the other hand, the race of the defendant  can aﬀect ∗
 either because of diﬀerences in
 or due to diﬀerences in the signal distributions  or due to diﬀerences in the cost of
committing crimes that translates in diﬀerent proportions of guilty (·) in expression (4).
Therefore if the court does not discriminate over the race of the victim, the error rate should
be independent of it, even though it could depend upon the race of the defendant. If for given
race of the defendant we ﬁnd higher error rates in cases involving white victims compared to
minority victims, this is evidence of racial bias in favor of white victims. In our model, this
bias originates from a lower weight given to type I errors in cases involving a white victim
(  ), which led the court to apply a lower standard of proof, ceteris paribus. The
intuition for this result is illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
[Figures 1 and 2 about here]
Figure 1 shows the density functions of the signal  for non-guilty and guilty defendants,
holding constant the race of the defendant. The type I error is the shaded area to the right
of the threshold ∗ When we hold constant the race of the defendant and vary the race of
the victim, the assumptions of our model imply that the distributions 
 and 
 do not shift.
Hence the only way one could obtain diﬀerent error rates is through a shift in the value of ∗
w h i c hi nt u r nm u s tr e ﬂect diﬀerent values of  Figure 1 shows an example where  decreases
(e.g., less weight is given to type I errors against defendants who killed white victims), the
threshold ∗ moves left, and the error rate increases.
On the other hand, a similar inference cannot be made if one holds constant the race
of the victim and compares errors against defendants of diﬀerent races. In other words,
we cannot derive from our model the implication that if the court does not discriminate
across defendants we should ﬁnd the same error rate for white and minority defendants
when we hold constant the race of the victim. Figure 2 illustrates the point. The top and
bottom panels of ﬁgure 2 display, respectively, the signal distributions for white and minority
defendants, holding constant the race of the victim. Because our model allows 
 and 

to diﬀer according to the defendant’s race  error rates (the shaded areas in ﬁgure 2) may
diﬀer even when the court is unbiased and selects the same threshold ∗14
Thus we cannot test for the presence of bias only on the race of the defendant, while we
can test for bias which depends on the race of the victim (bias type 2 and 3 in the deﬁnition
above). We now derive a test for the relatively more conservative deﬁnition that bias is
purely a function of victim’s race (bias of type 2). This amounts to asking the question: in
the presence of bias related to the victim’s race, does this bias aﬀe c td e f e n d a n t so fd i ﬀerent
races in the same way? In the empirical section we will show that the answer is “no”, and
14T h ef a c tt h a tt h et h r e s h o l d∗ is the same for both defendant races is neither a necessary nor a suﬃcient
condition for unbiasedeness of the court. It is used in ﬁgure 2 purely for illustrative purposes. Also, the fact
that we allow the distributions of idiosyncratic costs  to diﬀer across races implies that we could not make
inference on bias by comparing errors across defendant races even if the signal distributions were the same.
11that according to our results the behavior of the court is consistent with a bias that depends
on the particular combination of defendant and victim race (bias type 3).
Proposition 1 If  =  independent of , then the ranking of average error rates
() and () should not depend on  for  ∈ {}.
Proof: Suppose without loss of generality that  =    =  Consider
ﬁrst minority defendants. Because ∗
 is strictly increasing in     implies
∗
  ∗
 w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e s()  () due to the fact that () is
strictly decreasing in ∗
 The same reasoning applies to white defendants, with  =
   =  implying ()  () ¤
Thus the following condition must hold if the court discriminates on the basis of victims’
race but treats defendants of diﬀerent races in an unbiased way:15
()  () ⇐⇒ ()  () (8)
Expression (8) says that if we ﬁnd a higher error rate on minority defendants who killed
white victims, compared to minority defendants who killed minority victims, then we should
also ﬁnd a higher error rate on white defendants who killed white victims than on white
defendants who killed minority victims, and vice versa. This forms the basis for our rank
order test.
3.3 Discussion and extensions
Bias in the collection of evidence
A crucial assumption underlying our test is that the functions 
() and 
() do not depend
jointly on the race of the defendant and on the race of the victim. A similar restriction is
common to other outcome based tests of prejudice, such as Knowles et al. (2001) and Anwar
and Fang (2006). Nonetheless, even if we were to allow dependence of  
() and 
()
on  as well as , it is unclear in which direction the bias would go. Suppose for instance
that such dependence on race pairs were due to police work. On the one hand, the police
may work harder to get accurate evidence in cases involving minority defendants and white
victims. This would make it easier for the courts to “separate” guilt and innocence and the
proportion of errors would be lower for these cases. On the other hand, a biased police may
“fabricate” evidence against minorities when the victim is white. In this case the bias would
go in the opposite direction, i.e. we would ﬁnd more errors for minority defendants/white
victims pairs.16
15Expression (8) refers to the case of bias in favor of white victims. Obviously for bias in favor of minority
victims the inequalities should be reversed. Our use of rank order tests is in the same spirit of Anwar and
Fang (2006), with the diﬀerence that in their case one of the two dimensions over which troopers’ success
rates are computed pertains to the behavior of the agent who may be discriminating (i.e., the police oﬃcer),
while in our case the two dimensions pertain to oﬀender and victim characteristics, and not features of the
court.
16Empirically, Radelet and Pierce (1985) analyzed a sample of 1017 homicides in Florida in the period
1973-77 and compared the descriptions of the homicides in police reports with the (later) descriptions given
by courts. They found that homicides involving African American suspects and white victims were more
likely to be described as “felony” by prosecutors than by the police.
12Bias in the decisions of superior courts
Another hypothesis in our model is that superior courts never make mistakes and are racially
unbiased. If superior courts made errors which were uncorrelated with the combination of
defendant/victim race, this would not invalidate our test of racial bias. We can also relax
this assumption in one direction. Suppose for example that superior courts were racially
biased in the same direction of lower courts. This would go against ﬁnding higher errors
on certain racial pairs because the superior courts would simply reaﬃrm the ﬁrst sentence.
That is, if we did not ﬁnd evidence of racial bias based upon our test it could mean that the
same bias applies to all levels of courts. Thus not ﬁnding a bias could be inconclusive but
ﬁnding it would not. Note that if the racial bias declines with subsequent stages of revision
(from state courts to federal Habeas Corpus courts) then we should ﬁnd that the diﬀerence
in errors rates across pairs of defendant’s and victim’s race should become larger in later
stages of appeal. This is what we ﬁnd below.
What we cannot allow in our model is that superior courts are biased in the opposite
direction to lower courts, because in this case higher error rates may be interpreted as
“reverse discrimination” rather than evidence of mistakes by lower courts. We are not aware
of a literature that documents such bias in opposite directions, and at the same time the
pattern of inequalities that we ﬁnd in our tests (higher error rates on cases in which defendant
and victim are from diﬀerent racial groups) would require a particular pattern of bias by
superior courts, not in favor of a particular group but of speciﬁc “pairings” of races. Having
said this, in the empirical part of the paper we try to address the possibility of bias by
superior courts by testing if our results depend on certain characteristics of the appeal court
(e.g., political orientation). We do not ﬁnd evidence that the pattern of reversal we uncover
is driven by the ideology of the appeal judges.
Plea bargain
Many potential capital cases are plea bargained. The strength of the evidence against the
defendant and the severity of the crime are critical factors in determining the incentive for
defense and prosecution to pursue a plea bargain. Comprehensive empirical studies of the
nature and characteristics of plea agreements are hard to come by due to data limitations.
There is evidence that minority defendants and defendants with previous criminal history
receive a harsher plea bargained prison term (Humphrey and Fogarty, 1987). Models of plea
bargain typically involve asymmetric information between prosecutor and defendant about
the strength of the case, as in for instance Grossman and Katz (1983) and Reinganum (1988).
In our model we do not have this asymmetry and only with this extension (which we leave
for future research) we could incorporate plea bargain in a meaningful way.
As far as our empirical test is concerned, if the likelihood that a case is plea bargained were
uncorrelated to the races of the racial pair defendant/victim, our test would be unaﬀected.
If it were not, then this correlation might introduce a bias, but the direction of the bias is
unclear, as it would depend among other things on the shape of the signal distribution.
We tried to empirically assess the potential relevance of this source of bias using data on
a representative sample of murders adjudicated in 1988 in 33 of the largest counties in the
US.17 This dataset includes information on race of the defendant and of the victim, as well
17U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Murder Cases in 33 Large Urban Counties in the
United States, 1988. Distributed by ICPSR 9907, 1996.
13as the ﬁnal disposition outcome of the case (among which guilty plea). When we regress the
likelihood of guilty plea on race of the defendant, race of the victim, and the interaction of
the two, the coeﬃcient on the interaction is not statistically diﬀerent from zero.18
4 The data
To implement our test of racial bias we could not rely on any readily available dataset.
In fact all existing data sets containing information on the race of the defendant and of
the victim in capital cases have limited geographical and temporal coverage and — most
importantly for our purposes — do not contain information on whether the capital sentence
was reaﬃrmed or not in appeal. The only comprehensive dataset containing information
on judicial errors in capital cases, that is the one use in Liebman et al’s (2000) study and
compiled by Fagan and Liebman (2002, from now on FL), does not contain information
o nt h er a c eo ft h ed e f e n d a n tn o ro nt h er a c eo ft h ev i c t i m . W et h e r e f o r ec o n s t r u c t e do u r
dataset by examining each individual record in FL’s data and searching for information on
the race of the defendant and of the victim. For a detailed description of FL’s data collection
methodology and variable deﬁnition we refer the reader to Liebman et al. (2000). In what
follows we start by brieﬂy reviewing the characteristics and scope of FL’s data, then discuss
our search methodology and present some descriptive statistics.
Data coverage
FL’s data is the ﬁrst systematic collection of information on capital appeals in the modern
death penalty era in the US. We use two datasets originally compiled by FL:19
• direct appeal dataset (DA from now on): 4,546 state capital cases whose direct
appeal decisions became ﬁnal between January 1, 1973 and December 31, 1995.20 This
is the universe of all capital sentences that were reviewed on direct appeal by a state
high court.
• habeas corpus dataset (HC from now on): 557 capital cases whose review was
ﬁnalized by a federal Habeas Corpus court between January 1, 1973 and December 31,
1995. This is the universe of all capital sentences that were ﬁnally reviewed over this
period.










where  is a dummy for non-white defendant,  is a dummy for white victim, and standard errors are
clustered at the county level. The results are very similar if we include county ﬁxed eﬀects.
19FL also compiled a "post-conviction" dataset which, however, is incomplete due to the fact that state
post-conviction decisions are often not published and includes a selected subset of cases, all of which resulted
in a reversal. In our analysis we therefore only employ the DA and HC datasets, which comprise the universe
of available cases at those stages.
20“Became ﬁnal” should be understood as “the highest state court with jurisdiction to review capital
judgments in the relevant state must have taken one or two actions during the study period: (1) aﬃrmed
the capital judgment or (2) overturned the capital judgement (either the conviction or the sentence) on one
or more grounds” (Liebman et al. (2000), p. 126).
14A f t e re l i m i n a t i n gc a s e sf o rw h i c ht h en a m eo ft h ed e f e n d a n tc o u l dn o tb ei d e n t i ﬁed, we
are left with a pool of 4,416 observations in DA and 531 observations in HC.21
Deﬁnition of error
In FL’s data, “error” is deﬁned as such only if it led to the reversal of a capital conviction
or sentence. If an error was discovered that did not result in a reversal, this is not coded as
“error” in the database. For DA cases, a “serious error” that warrants reversal must have
three characteristics. First, it must be “prejudicial”, in the sense of aﬀecting the outcome
of the case (harmless errors do not lead to reversals). Second, it must have been “properly
preserved”, in the sense that the claim must have been asserted at the time and in the way
r e q u i r e db yt h el a w .T h i r d ,o b v i o u s l yt h ee r r o rm u s th a v eb e e nd i s c o v e r e d .A tt h ef e d e r a lH C
stage, a serious error is reversible if, in addition to satisfying the three conditions required
for DA, it violates the federal Constitution.22
Collection of the race variables
FL’s data does not contain any information on the race of the defendant, nor of the victim. To
collect such information, we relied on a number of sources including the Lexis Nexis database,
the quarterly publication “Death Row USA” issued by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund,
information from the Department of Corrections of several states, FBI UCR Supplementary
Homicide Files, the CDC National Death Index, a number of web sites specialized in death
penalty issues, plus communications with police oﬃcers and defense lawyers.23 After over
two years of attempts we managed to construct an almost complete data set for HC and a
very extensive one for DA. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only dataset currently
s p a n n i n gt w od e c a d e so ft r i a l sf o rt h ee n t i r eU St h a tc o n t a i n si n f o r m a t i o no nr a c eo fd e f e n d a n t
and victim.
[Table 1 about here]
Table 1 reports a tabulation of cases with missing information on the race of defendant
and victim for the HC (Panel A) and the DA (panel B) datasets. In the HC data, we achieved
almost full coverage of the defendant’s race (3 missing cases out of 531), but we are missing
information on the race of the victim in 20 cases out of the 528 for which we have the race of
the defendant. Thus we have a usable sample of 508 cases out of 531. In the DA data, we
have information on defendants’ race for 4,146 cases out of 4,416 (94 percent of the sample),
and on victims’ race for 3,717 cases out of these 4,146 (90 percent). Appendix Tables A1 and
A2 contain summary statistics on the share of missing observations by state and by year.
21For 26 of the 557 cases in HC, either the sentence indicated in FL’s data or the name of the defendant
could not be found in Lexis-Nexis, hence we drop those cases. In the DA dataset, the sentence could not
be found for 84 of the 4,546 available cases. Also, because some observations in the DA dataset correspond
to multiple sentences for the same ﬁrst degree trial and we want to record error once for each trial, we use
one observation per appeal-trial pair and attribute an error if it was found in the ﬁrst stage appeal (the one
automatically granted by all States).
22Some additional technical rules for reversibility at the HC stage are listed in Liebman et al. (2000), p.
130.
23A detailed description of the search procedure and of the sources is available from the authors upon
request.
15[Table 2 about here]
In Table 2 we try to gauge the extent of possible selection in the pattern of missing data
for victims’ race for all cases in which we have information on the defendant’s race. We
report the means of several variables related to defendant, victim, and crime characteristics
f o rt h es u bs a m p l ei nw h i c hw eh a v ei n f o r m a t i o no nv i c t i m s ’r a c e( c o l u m n1 )a n dt h ec a s e s
in which we don’t (column 2). We conduct a t-test for the equality of means and report the
p-values in column 3.
Panel A refers to HC cases. For demographic characteristics of the defendant like race
and gender we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence across the two sub samples. Age is
higher for defendants whose victims’ race is missing (p-value 11). Characteristics like prior
felony convictions, history of drug abuse, and deprived family background are also balanced
across the two sub samples. History of alcohol abuse is more frequent among cases for which
victim’s race is available (p-value 09). Turning to victims’ characteristics: the number of
victims, the presence of policemen or public oﬃcials among the victims, and whether the
victim had high status in the community all have similar means when victims’ race is missing
and when it is not. The only characteristic for which the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant
is the gender of the victim, but we show below that our results are robust to excluding female
victims.
Turning to crime characteristics, we report the means of two variables that may be corre-
lated with unobservables speciﬁc to pairs of defendant/victim races. The ﬁrst is whether the
defendant knew the victim: crimes against unknown victims may be considered as relatively
more threatening by the jury and be sanctioned more harshly. The second is a dummy
for whether the crime involved heinous, atrocious, cruel circumstances. We do not ﬁnd a
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in means across sub samples for either of these measures.
These ﬁndings increase our conﬁdence that there may not be a signiﬁcant degree of selection
on unobservables in the cases for which we have information on victim race.
In Table 2B we repeat a similar analysis for the DA dataset, only for a smaller number
of variables because the information coded by FL in the DA dataset is much more limited.
Again, characteristics like gender and race of the defendant are perfectly balanced, while
defendants’ age is higher by 1.5 years in the sample for which victims’ race is missing. The
number and gender of the victims, as well as the likelihood that the victim is the partner,
are not statistically diﬀerent across subsamples. On the other hand, the likelihood that the
victim is a policeman or a public oﬃcial is signiﬁcantly higher when victim race is available,
likely due to media coverage. One of the robustness tests we conduct below is to exclude
cases where the victim is a policeman or public oﬃcial, and our results hold.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 reports summary statistics on the main variables of interest in the HC (Panel A)
and DA (Panel B) datasets.
[Table 3 about here]
In the HC data the error rate, measured by the variable “Relief” as the fact that relief
is granted at some stage of the review process, is 36 Regarding the race of the defendant,
51 percent of the cases involve white defendants, 44 percent African Americans, with the
16remaining fraction being mostly constituted by Hispanics. In contrast to the relatively even
split between white and African American in the defendant’s race, 83 percent of the cases
involve a white victim, and only 13 percent an African American victim. Cases in which a
non-white defendant killed a white victim constitute 36 percent of the total, as opposed to
3 percent for the cases in which a white defendant killed a non-white victim. The remaining
cases are split between non-whites who killed non-whites (13 percent) and whites who killed
whites (48 percent). The proportions are fairly similar for the DA sample (ﬁrst appeal): 37
percent of the sentences are overturned; 51 percent of the defendants are white, 41 percent
are African American; 78 percent of the cases involve a white victim, as opposed to 17
percent with an African American victim. In this sample the share of non-white defendants
who killed a white victim is 30
5R e s u l t s
The test for racial bias we derived in section 3 required that, in the absence of bias against
particular defendant/victim pairs, a diﬀerence in error rates for defendants of a given race
depending on the victim’s race should be maintained in the same direction for defendants of
ad i ﬀerent race. To implement this test we use a rank order test reminiscent of Anwar and
Fang’s (2006) test for prejudice.
We hold constant the defendant’s race  and compare error rates across victim’s race,
 ∈ {} L e tu sd e n o t ew i t h \ (), the average error rate for cases in which a
defendant of race  killed a victim of race  We test the null \ ()= \ () (absence of
racial bias) against the alternative \ ()  \ () (racial bias in favor of white victims)
using the Z-statistic:
 =







where  ∈ {};  is the sample variance of the error variable in the cases involving
a defendant of race  and a victim of race ; and  is the number of cases involving a
defendant of race  and a victim of race ,w i t h ∈ {} Under the null hypothesis and
given our large sample,  has a standard normal distribution by the Central Limit Theorem.
We will thus reject the null in favor of the alternative if expression (9) exceeds a threshold
value  where  is the signiﬁcance level of the test and Φ()=1− Performing this test
separately for each defendant race allows us to test the prediction of our model, expression
(8).
5.1 Main results
[Table 4 about here]
Table 4 contains the outcome of our test for the HC (Panel A) and the DA (Panel B)
datasets and the main result of the paper. Each cell reports the average probability of
error (“Relief”) for a given combination of defendant’s and victim’s race, \ (),a n dt h e
associated standard error (in parenthesis). The p-values reported at the end of each row
are those associated with test statistic (9). They represent the probability that, for a given
17defendant’s race reported in that row, a diﬀerence in the error rates between white and
minority victims at least as large as the one reported can be found, given that the null (of
no racial bias against defendant/victim pairs) is true.
The ﬁrst row of Table 4, Panel A shows that in cases involving a white defendant the
average error rate is 36 percent if the victim is white and 47 p e r c e n ti fi ti sn o n - w h i t e ,w i t h
ad i ﬀerence of −11 percentage points.24 On the other hand, in cases involving a minority
defendant, the error rate is 375 if the victim is white, and 284 p e r c e n ti fi ti sn o n - w h i t e ,w i t h
ad i ﬀerence of +9 percentage points (or a 32 percent increase over the the non-white/non-
white error rate). The diﬀerences in error rates across victim’s race thus go in opposite
directions depending on the defendant’s race. For the cases involving minority defendants,
we reject the null of no diﬀerence against the alternative of a positive diﬀerence in error rates
with a p-value of 08; for cases involving white defendants we fail to reject the null against the
alternative (p-value 80). Based on our rank order test, we therefore reject the hypothesis of
no racial bias on defendant/victim racial pairs on behalf of trial courts. In Panel B we show
the same result for the DA sample. In the case of white defendants there is a −2 percentage
points diﬀerence in error rates between white and non-white victim, though not statistically
signiﬁcant. In the case of minority defendants the diﬀerence is +3 percentage points (a 9
percent increase over the the non-white/non-white error rate of 35)a n di ss i g n i ﬁcant at
the10 percent level. Again, we reject the null of no racial bias on defendant/victim racial
pairs.
Note that our rank order test implies that the diﬀerence in error rates across columns
s h o u l dg oi nt h es a m ed i r e c t i o nf o rb o t hr o w si nt h ep r e v i o u st a b l e s( a n di na l lt h o s et h a t
follow). We shall see that for the case of minority defendants (second row) the ﬁrst entry
is always larger than the second entry almost always in a statistically signiﬁcant way, while
for white defendants (ﬁrst row) the pattern of relative sizes of error rates typically goes in
the opposite direction.
Note also that the fact that the diﬀerences in errors is larger for the HC sample is consis-
tent with the possibility that racial bias is eliminated in steps, that is, the DA courts may
be less biased than the ﬁrst degree courts but still biased relative to the ﬁnal federal panels.
[Table 5 about here]
In Table 5 we examine whether the pattern of results diﬀers across regions. We ﬁnd that
the pattern of racial bias we uncovered is driven by Southern states. In the HC sample
when we restrict the sample to sentences imposed by Southern courts we ﬁnd a very large
and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in errors for minority defendants who killed whites
compared to minorities who killed non-whites: the diﬀerence is striking at 154 percentage
points (a 66 percent increase over the non-white/non-white error rate of 23), with a p-
value of 001 The diﬀerence goes in the opposite direction and is not signiﬁcant for white
defendants. A similar pattern emerges for DA cases in the South (Table 5B), but with a
smaller diﬀerence (33 percentage points for minority defendants, p-value 013). Again, the
corresponding diﬀerence for white defendants has the opposite sign and is not signiﬁcant.
When we conduct analogous tests for all other regions we fail to reject the null based
on our rank order test for both HC and DA. In HC the error rate is higher with non-white
than with white victims both if the defendant is white and if he is not. In DA the sign
24Note that, compared to other combinations, the number of cases involving white defendants and minority
victims is quite small.
18p a t t e r ni nt h ed i ﬀerences is reversed compared to the South, but none of these diﬀerences is
statistically signiﬁcant. One caveat about the results for regions other than the South in the
HC sample, however, is that they cover a substantially smaller number of cases compared to
those for the South.
5.2 Potential confounding factors
So far we have interpreted the results of our rank order tests as indicative of potential racial
bias on behalf of the trial court. An alternative interpretation would be that the pattern of
inequalities in error rates is generated by unobserved characteristics that are systematically
correlated with diﬀerent combinations of defendant and victim races. In the notation of our
model, this would amount to allowing the distribution of the evidence to depend on both
races, e.g., 
 () and 
 (). Although we cannot test for this possibility explicitly, in
this section we aim at providing evidence on the importance of potentially omitted factors by
conditioning on a set of available characteristics that might be correlated with such factors.
Crime characteristics
One may conjecture that cases involving minority defendants and white victims may diﬀer in
t h et y p eo fc r i m ei n v o l v e da n dt h a tt h ed i ﬀerence in error rates reﬂects characteristics of the
crime rather than racial bias. The short answer is that we do not ﬁnd any evidence in support
of this interpretation. Although this does not eliminate the possibility that diﬀerences in
unobservables exist -and indeed this is one of the motivating factors of our analysis- if we
ﬁnd that our results are not aﬀected by conditioning on observables that proxy for the type
of crime.
[Table 6 about here]
In table 6 we present our evidence. In Panel A we start from the HC sample, for which
relatively detailed information on the crime was collected by FL. First we test whether the
gender of the victim is a signiﬁcant factor in our results. In the ﬁr s tp a n e lo fT a b l e6 Aw e
restrict the attention to cases in which none of the victims was female. We ﬁnd higher error
on minority defendants who killed white men than on those who killed non-white men (the
diﬀerence is 106 percentage points, p-value 12). The corresponding diﬀerence for white
defendants is −116 (p-value 77).
An aggravating factor that may be responsible for the results we ﬁnd is the fact that the
defendant killed a police, or ﬁreman, or guard, or other public oﬃcial. One could conjecture
that crimes involving minority defendants and white victims are more represented in this
category and that this generates the higher error rates we ﬁnd. When we repeat the analysis
considering cases in which none of the victims was one of these public oﬃcials (indicated
as “no police victim” in the table), we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in error rates for white
defendants, and a diﬀerence of 13 percentage points for minority defendants, with p-value
03. So our results are not driven by this types of murders.
Another aggravating factor might be the presence of multiple victims. Restricting the
analysis to homicides with only one victim shows a diﬀerence of 9 percentage points for non-
white defendants who killed white versus nonwhite victims (p-value 09)a n da ni n s i g n i ﬁcant
diﬀerence on the opposite direction for white defendants.
19The remaining of Table 6A reports results for other crime characteristics which are avail-
able only for the HC sample. A commonly held view is that cases in which an outsider who
does not know the victim commits a murder are perceived as particularly threatening and
sanctioned with more severe punishments. One could conjecture that cases involving minor-
ity defendants and white victims fall disproportionately in this category. In the fourth panel
o fT a b l e6 Aw ee x a m i n et h es u b s e to fc a s e sw h e r et h ed e f e n d a n tw a sn o tc o n n e c t e dt ot h e
community where the crime occurred, according to the information recorded in FL. These
cases should be relatively comparable along this dimension. Our results show that in this
subsample the likelihood of error is 15 percentage points higher for minority defendants who
killed white victims compared to minority defendants whose victims were not white (p-value
03). The corresponding diﬀerence in error rates for white defendants has the opposite sign
and is not statistically signiﬁcant. In the ﬁfth panel we consider the subset of cases where
the victims were not “high status”, as classiﬁed by FL. We ﬁnd a diﬀerence of 9 percentage
points (p-value 012) for the combination of minority defendants and white victim and no
diﬀerence for the opposite combination.
Another way to gauge the role of potentially omitted crime characteristics is to conﬁne our
attention to murders that occurred in “similar” environmental conditions. In particular, in
the sixth panel of Table 6A we consider murders committed during a robbery. The likelihood
of judicial error is 18 percentage points higher for minority defendants who killed at least
one white victim during a robbery compared to minority defendants whose victims were all
non-white, and is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level. The diﬀerence for white defendants is in
the opposite direction and not statistically signiﬁcant. Finally, when we restrict the sample
to cases that are similar in the sense of being classiﬁed as “felony murders”, we ﬁnd a 13
percentage points higher error rate for nonwhite defendants who killed white victims (p-value
07), and no corresponding diﬀerence for white defendants.
We have less information on crime characteristics for the DA compared to the HC sample.
I nT a b l e6 Bw es h o ww h a tw eh a v ef o rt h eD As a m p l e . F i r s tw et e s tw h e t h e rt h eg e n d e ro f
t h ev i c t i mi sas i g n i ﬁcant factor in our results. In the ﬁrst panel we restrict the attention to
cases in which none of the victims was female. We ﬁnd 8 percentage points higher error on
minority defendants who killed white men than on those who killed nonwhite men (p-value
01). The corresponding diﬀerence for white defendants is in the opposite direction and not
signiﬁcant. In the second panel we only consider murders that did not involve public oﬃcials
and we ﬁnd a diﬀerence in error rates of 3 percentage points for minority defendants (with
a borderline p-value 105), and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence for white defendants. Finally, when
we restrict the analysis to homicides with only one victim we ﬁnd again a diﬀerence of 3
percentage points for nonwhite defendants who killed white vs. nonwhite victims, but the
p-value increases to 16.
Legal assistance
Diﬀerences in error rates could be due to unequal quality of legal assistance of the defendant.
Thus a possible interpretation of our main ﬁnding is that minority defendants who killed a
white victim receive systematically worse legal assistance compared to minority defendants
who killed a minority victim. Incidentally this may be another source of racial bias, but it
would be of a diﬀerent nature than the one modelled in this paper and would not be a bias
of the courts.
[Table 7 about here]
20In Table 7 we repeat our tests restricting the sample to cases that are relatively similar
in terms of some trial characteristics. We can only do this for HC cases because no trial
characteristic is available in the DA dataset. As a proxy for the quality of legal assistance
at the trial stage we use the fact that “ineﬀective assistance of counsel” in the guilt and
sentencing phase was included among the claims for relief.25 We start by restricting the
sample to 381 HC cases in which ineﬀective assistance of counsel was not raised as the
ﬁrst claim in the appeal. In this subset of cases the diﬀerence in error rates for minority
defendants who killed a white vs. a non-white victim is 145 percentage points (p-value 02).
If we further restrict the sample to the 220 cases in which ineﬀective assistance of counsel was
n o tr a i s e da ta l la m o n gt h ec l a i m s ,t h ed i ﬀerence increases to 19 percentage points (p-value
04). Comparing these results to those in table 4 suggests that variation in the quality of
legal assistance across racial combinations of defendants and victims may actually lead us
to underestimate the extent of bias.
In the remaining parts of table 7, we consider the subset of cases in which “prosecutor’s
suppression or withholding of evidence or other prosecutorial misconduct” was not raised
among the claims, nor was “improper interrogation”, that is, there was no involuntary con-
fession or guilty plea or request for attorney denied. In both sub samples the order of
magnitude of the diﬀerences in error rates and the signiﬁcance level remain comparable to
those of table 4, and the rank order test rejects the null of absence of racial bias according to
our model (except for the third panel where the p-value for nonwhite defendants increases
to 16).
Note that although the above variables seem reasonably good proxies for the quality of
legal assistance, some of them reﬂect discretionary choices on behalf of the defense in the
appeal process (e.g., which claim to present ﬁrst, etc.) and in this sense they may not be
fully objective. Nonetheless, we take the evidence in table 7 as suggestive that diﬀerences in
the quality of legal assistance are not entirely responsible for our results.
5.3 Possible bias of appeal courts
So far we have assumed that the appeal courts are unbiased. As we mentioned above, errors
uncorrelated with pairs of defendant/victim races are irrelevant for our empirical test. If the
appeal court is biased in the same direction of the trial court, our test will underestimate the
extent of racial bias because the (biased) appeal court will reverse the trial court decision
less often than an unbiased court would do. The challenge for us would arise from a bias
in the opposite direction, namely if the appeal court were inclined to give relief more often
than an unbiased court would do. Note that a simple bias of the appeal courts in favor
of black defendants (for example on the ground that they are on average poorer and may
not be able to aﬀord good legal assistance) would not invalidate our tests of racial bias.
What would be problematic for us is a situation where the bias is linked to a particular
combination of defendant/victim race, e.g. if the appeal court rules systematically more in
favor of non-white defendants who killed white victims. Although we cannot rule this out a
priori, we question the plausibility of this scenario by exploiting information on the political
orientation of appeal judges. We conjecture that, if a bias in favor of minorities who killed
white victims existed, this would more likely be found among liberal judges than among
25Fagan and Liebman’s (2002) dataset contains the list of claims raised, as well as the order in which the
claims were raised.
21conservative ones. Normally, the ideology of judges is correlated with party aﬃliation, hence
we repeat our analysis conditioning on party aﬃliation of the appeal judges.
Let’s begin with the HC sample. For each sentence, we collected the names of the judges
who served on the appeal court that decided on that sentence, and recovered information on
these judges from the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges available from the Federal
Judicial center. This directory contains biographical information on all judges that served
on U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit
Courts since 1789. We recorded the year in which each judge was appointed to the relevant
court and classiﬁed the political orientation of the judge as “Republican” if he or she was
appointed under a Republican president and “Democratic” if he or she was appointed under
a Democratic president. If our results were driven by “reverse discrimination” on behalf of
appeal judges, we should not ﬁnd discrimination (or ﬁnd it to a lesser extent) when we look
at courts that are predominantly composed of republican judges.
[Table 8 about here]
Table 8A reports the results for the subset of HC cases where the majority (ﬁrst panel)
or the totality (second panel) of the judges were appointed under a Republican president.
Both sets of results are consistent with our earlier ﬁndings, and indicate a higher likelihood
of relief for nonwhite defendants who killed white victims. The magnitude of the diﬀerence
in error rates is 7 percentage points when we consider appeal courts where a majority of the
judges are Republican (ﬁrst panel, p-value 20), and 13 percentage points when we restrict
our test to courts that are entirely composed of republican-appointed judges (second panel,
p-value 09). In the third panel we consider the possibility that the political climate in a given
year may aﬀect relief rates, and restrict the sample to Habeas Corpus appeal sentences that
occurred under a Republican administration. We ﬁnd a diﬀerence of 17 percentage points
for non-white defendants who killed white victims (p-value 01). In all three panels the
corresponding diﬀerence for white defendants is in the opposite direction and not signiﬁcant.
I nT a b l e8 Bw ec o n d u c tas i m i l a re x e r c i s ef o rt h eD Ad a t a s e t . I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v e
available both the party aﬃliation of the Direct Appeal judges and the measure of judges’
ideology proposed by Brace, Langer and Hall (2000), which they label PAJID.26 The ﬁrst
panel of Table 8B shows that when we restrict the sample to ﬁrst stage appeals decided by
courts in which at least 50 percent of the judges were Republican, error rates on nonwhite
defendants who killed white victims are 75 percentage points higher than on those who
killed nonwhite victims (p-value 05). For white defendants, error rates are virtually the
same across victim races. In the remaining panels we rely on the continuous measure of
ideology proposed by Brace et al. (2000) and deﬁne as “conservative” judges whose ideology
score falls in the top 50 percent of the distribution of PAJID. The second panel restricts the
sample to courts whose median member (in terms of ideology) is “conservative”, while the
third does the same but with reference to the Chief Justice. In both cases we ﬁnd that the
direction and the magnitude of the diﬀerences in error rates are comparable to our main
results in Table 4, though we lose statistical signiﬁcance. Furthermore, this result does not
depend on the particular cutoﬀ for the deﬁnition of “conservative”. Figure 3 shows that the
positive diﬀerence in error rates for minority defendants who killed white versus nonwhite
26Essentially PAIJD measures judges’ ideology on a scale from conservative to liberal based upon party
aﬃliation modiﬁed by a set of criteria allowing for diﬀerences across states. We match this measure to reﬂect
the composition of the state appeal court the year in which the appeal sentence was issued.
22victims holds for each and every quartile of the distribution of PAJID, indicating that our
main result is not driven by the ideological orientation of the court. The corresponding
diﬀerences for white defendants are instead sometimes positive, sometimes negative, and
vary by quartile.
[Figure 3 about here]
To sum up, we ﬁnd no evidence that left liberal leaning judges are those who “correct”
more mistakes in pairs involving minority defendants and white victims. In fact we ﬁnd that
our results hold strong when we restrict the sample to relatively conservative appeal courts.
Thus, we ﬁnd no obvious evidence of reverse discrimination by higher courts.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper proposes an outcome based test for racial bias in capital sentencing in the US.
We use the share of judicial errors in ﬁrst degree sentencing as an indicator of racial bias
of such courts. Our maintained assumption is that superior courts (especially the federal
courts dealing with the Habeas Corpus ﬁnal appeal stage) have less racial prejudice or no
prejudice at all. Note that, if they had, this would bias our results against ﬁnding bias in the
ﬁrst sentencing. Using an originally collected dataset, we uncover a bias against minority
defendants killing white victims. More precisely, according to our interpretation ﬁrst degree
courts tend to place less weight on the possibility of condemning an innocent in cases of
minority defendants with one or more white victims relative to minority defendants who did
not kill whites. The same does not hold for white defendants. This result is not explained
by diﬀerences in observable characteristics of the crime or of the trial, nor by the ideological
orientation of appeal courts.
Appendix
To simplify the notation, in sections A.1 and A.2 we omit subscripts and superscripts related
to race, i.e. we write  instead of  and   instead of 


A.1 Proof of uniqueness of the equilibrium
Claim 1.T h e r ee x i s t sa nb  ∈ [01) such that
∗()
  0 for all b 
Proof. From (1)w ec a nc a l c u l a t et h ed e r i v a t i v eo f∗() with respect to  as
∗()













() is strictly increasing in  By assumption
()
() → +∞ as  → 1 Therefore
there exists a value b  ∈ [01) such that the expression in square brackets in (A1) is positive
for all b 
23Claim 2.I f∗ is an equilibrium, then ∗  b 
Proof. From (1) we have ∗(0) =  −   0.F r o m ( 5 )w eh a v e=(∗(0)) = 0 because
= has support in R+. Furthermore, =(∗()) = 0 for all  ≤ b  Suppose that in equilibrium
∗  b  Then we would have (∗)==(∗(∗)) = 0 But in this case the optimal response
o ft h ec o u r tw o u l db et os e t∗ =1 b , a contradiction.
Claim 3. The equilibrium ∗ is unique.
Suppose there were two equilibria, ∗
0 and ∗
1 with b  ∗
0  ∗
1. From Claim 1 this would
imply 0  ∗(∗
0)  ∗(∗
1) a n di nt u r n(∗
0)  (∗
1). But then the optimal response of the
court would involve setting ∗
0  ∗
1 a contradiction.
A.2 Proof that the equilibrium error rate is decreasing in ∗













1−(∗) is decreasing in ∗ Taking




















The ﬁrst addendum in (A3) is negative because the equilibrium (∗) is increasing in ∗,
following Claims 1 and 2 above. To see that the second addendum is also negative, recall that




(∗) for any  ∗ Because the integrals in (A3) are
calculated for  ∈ (∗1] then in this range (∗)()  ()(∗) hence the expression
in square brackets is negative.
A.3 Case with random race of the victim
Consider the case in which the defendant cannot choose the race of the victim and the latter
is unknown ex ante. Deﬁne  ∈ (01) as the exogenous probability that the victim of the



















 ()( − )
ª

The payoﬀ from not committing a crime is:
− [1 − 





Γ( ) ≡ 

 ()+( 1− )

 ()
Γ( ) ≡ 

 ()+( 1− )

 ()
24Following the same procedure as in the text, we obtain the threshold level of  below which
a crime is committed.
 6 Γ( ) − [1 − Γ( )] +[ 1− Γ( )] ≡ 
∗( )
Obviously, ∗(·) depends on all the other parameters, namely , ,  and ,b u tt h el a t t e r
do not depend upon the races neither of the defendant nor of the victim and are common
knowledge. Relative to the case developed in the text, now the choice of each potential
criminal depends on both cutoﬀ points relative to the race of the victim. Repeating the
same steps of the proof in the text one reaches the same implications for our test of racial
bias.
A . 4C a s ew h e r et h er a c eo ft h ev i c t i mc a nb ec h o s e n
Consider now the case in which the criminal can choose the race of the victim. Under the
assumptions of our model if the court were biased and this led to setting a lower threshold
of evidence ∗ for, say, white victims, all potential criminals would choose minority victims.
If instead the court were unbiased potential criminals would be indiﬀerent on the race of
the victim and would randomize. This implies that under the assumptions of our model in
the presence of bias we should not observe in equilibrium a condition (killing white victims)
that allows us to test for bias. To be able to derive a test for bias in cases where the race of
the victim is a choice variable one should adopt a diﬀerent theoretical framework, e.g. one
in which there are diﬀerential beneﬁts to killing victims of diﬀerent races or the potential
criminal was uncertain about the bias of the court or the distribution of the signal. This
goes beyond the scope of the current analysis.
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Table 1: Missingness of race 
   
            Panel A: Habeas Corpus 





No  Yes  Total 
  No  508  20  528 
  Yes  3  0  3 
  Total  511  20  531 
                 
Panel B: Direct Appeal 





No  Yes  Total 
  No  3,717  447  4,146 
  Yes  130  122  252 
   Total  3,847  569  4416 
 
Table 2: Selection in missingness of victim's race 
     
         




Diff=0         
(p-val) 
Panel A:  Habeas Corpus       
Defendant characteristics       
 
Defendant is White  0.51  0.45  0.59 
 
Defendant is African American  0.44  0.50  0.60 
 
Male defendant  0.99  1.00  0.66 
 
Age of defendant  28.2  41.5  0.11 
 
Prior felony  0.22  0.25  0.79 
 
History of alcohol abuse   0.13  0.00  0.09 
 
History of drug abuse   0.17  0.10  0.44 
 
Deprived/Abused background  0.02  0.00  0.57 
Victim characteristics 
     
 
Number of victims  1.41  1.22  0.65 
 
Female victim  0.48  0.24  0.05 
 
High status victim  0.23  0.30  0.46 
 
Police victim  0.09  0.00  0.16 
Crime characteristics 
     
 
Defendant knew victim  0.26  0.25  0.94 
 
Heinous crime  0.40  0.30  0.37 
          Panel B: Direct Appeal 
     
Defendant characteristics       
 
Defendant is White  0.51  0.52  0.68 
 
Defendant is African American  0.41  0.40  0.69 
 
Male defendant  0.98  0.98  0.50 
 
Age of defendant  31.3  32.9  0.00 
Victim characteristics 
     
 
Number of victims  1.37  1.44  0.22 
 
Female victim  0.52  0.50  0.41 
 
Police victim  0.05  0.02  0.00 
   Partner victim  0.05  0.04  0.25 
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Panel A: Habeas Corpus
Variable  No. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Relief 508 0.36 0.48
African American defendant  508 0.44 0.50
White defendant  508 0.51 0.50
African American victim 508 0.13 0.34
White victim 508 0.83 0.37
White def., Non-white vict. 508 0.03 0.18
Non-white def., White vict. 508 0.36 0.48
White def., White vict. 508 0.48 0.50
Non-white def., Non-white vict. 508 0.13 0.34
Panel B: Direct Appeal
Variable  No. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Relief 3717 0.37 0.48
African American defendant  3717 0.41 0.49
White defendant  3717 0.51 0.50
African American victim 3717 0.17 0.38
White victim 3717 0.78 0.41
White def., Non-white vict. 3717 0.03 0.17
Non-white def., White vict. 3717 0.30 0.46
White def., White vict. 3717 0.48 0.50
Non-white def., Non-white vict. 3717 0.19 0.39
Table 3: Summary statistics
Sample with non-missing victim's race
Sample with non-missing victim's race31
Table 4: Error rates by Defendant and Victim's race
Panel A: Habeas Corpus
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.358 0.471 0.809 260
(0.031) (0.125)
Non-white 0.375 0.284 0.083 251
(0.036) (0.055)
N.obs  427 84
Panel B: Direct Appeal
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.373 0.395 0.673 1908
(0.011) (0.046)
Non-white 0.377 0.347 0.097 1809
(0.015) (0.018)
N.obs  2911 806
Note: Standard errors of the means in parenthesis
Table 5: Error rates by race and region
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.350 0.455 0.741 208 0.391 0.500 0.678 52
(0.034) (0.157) (0.073) (0.224)
Non-white 0.387 0.232 0.012 219 0.286 0.545 0.917 32
(0.038) (0.057) (0.101) (0.157)
N.obs  360 67 67 17
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.397 0.443 0.785 1305 0.322 0.286 0.324 603
(0.014) (0.056) (0.020) (0.077)
Non-white 0.409 0.376 0.134 1234 0.288 0.304 0.657 575
(0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.028)
N.obs  2048 491 863 315
Note: Standard errors of the means in parenthesis
Victim's race Victim's race
Victim's race Victim's race




Panel A: Habeas Corpus
South Other regions32
Table 6: Error rates conditional on crime characteristics
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.384 0.500 0.769 124
(0.046) (0.151)
Non-white 0.363 0.257 0.117 137
(0.048) (0.075)
N.obs 214 47
White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.367 0.438 0.703 242
(0.032) (0.128)
Non-white 0.391 0.262 0.030 222
(0.039) (0.057)
N.obs 387 77
White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.359 0.471 0.808 254
(0.031) (0.125)
Non-white 0.383 0.292 0.089 245
(0.036) (0.057)
N.obs 417 82
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.384 0.500 0.790 191
(0.037) (0.139)
Non-white 0.413 0.265 0.027 187
(0.042) (0.064)
N.obs 315 63
White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.398 0.385 0.463 209
(0.035) (0.140)
Non-white 0.397 0.309 0.124 186
(0.043) (0.063)
N.obs 327 68
White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.342 0.600 0.848 81
(0.055) (0.245)
Non-white 0.430 0.250 0.045 103
(0.056) (0.090)
N.obs 155 29
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.344 0.429 0.658 129
(0.043) (0.202)






Defendant not connected to community where crime occurred
Panel A: Habeas Corpus






Table 6 (cont'd): Error rates conditional on crime characteristics
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.358 0.403 0.768 831
(0.017) (0.058)
Non-white 0.413 0.333 0.008 926
(0.020) (0.026)
N.obs 1343 414
White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.371 0.394 0.678 1825
(0.012) (0.048)
Non-white 0.376 0.346 0.105 1688
(0.015) (0.018)
N.obs 2738 775
White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.389 0.374 0.389 1419
(0.013) (0.051)
Non-white 0.388 0.361 0.163 1382
(0.016) (0.022)
N.obs 2220 581





Panel B: Direct Appeal34
Table 7: Error rates conditional on trial characteristics
Habeas Corpus
White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.354 0.385 0.585 194
(0.036) (0.140)
Non-white 0.374 0.229 0.025 187
(0.041) (0.061)
N.obs 320 61
White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.458 0.571 0.708 114
(0.048) (0.202)
Non-white 0.417 0.227 0.037 106
(0.054) (0.091)
N.obs 191 29
White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.383 0.600 0.902 177
(0.038) (0.163)
Non-white 0.383 0.300 0.162 173
(0.042) (0.073)
N.obs 300 50
White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.362 0.500 0.849 234
(0.033) (0.129)
Non-white 0.387 0.283 0.070 223
(0.038) (0.059)
N.obs 381 76
Note: Standard errors of the means in parenthesis
Improper interrogation not in any claim
Ineffective assistance of counsel not in any claim
Ineffective assistance of counsel not 1st claim
Prosecutorial suppression/witholding of evidence not in any 
claim35
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.355 0.455 0.730 149
(0.041) (0.157)
Non-white 0.284 0.216 0.200 146
(0.043) (0.069)
N.obs  247 48
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.250 0.500 0.799 40
(0.073) (0.289)
Non-white 0.216 0.083 0.096 63
(0.058) (0.083)
N.obs  87 16
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.347 0.438 0.751 183
(0.037) (0.128)
Non-white 0.402 0.234 0.013 179
(0.043) (0.062)
N.obs  299 63
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.285 0.280 0.477 428
(0.023) (0.092)
Non-white 0.292 0.217 0.051 368
(0.031) (0.034)
N.obs  619 177
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.364 0.406 0.745 1151
(0.015) (0.062)
Non-white 0.380 0.354 0.199 1050
(0.018) (0.025)
N.obs  1781 420
Defendant's race White Non-white p-values N.obs
White 0.363 0.426 0.845 1155
(0.015) (0.060)
Non-white 0.385 0.352 0.142 1072
(0.018) (0.025)
N.obs  1790 437
Chief justice of State Supr Court conservative
Victim's race
Note: Standard errors of the means in parenthesis
Panel B: Direct Appeal
Majority of State Supreme Court Republican
Victim's race
Median ideology of State Supr Court conservative
Victim's race
Victim's race
Table 8: Possible bias of Appeal Courts
Majority of final federal panel Republican
Victim's race
All judges appointed under Republican
Victim's race
Sentence under Republican administration
Panel A: Habeas Corpus36



















1973 4 0 0.00 AL 19 1 0.05
1974 25 4 0.16 AR 24 0 0.00
1975 30 5 0.17 AZ 14 1 0.07
1976 25 2 0.08 CA 4 0 0.00
1977 45 3 0.07 DE 2 0 0.00
1978 48 1 0.02 FL 95 4 0.04
1979 51 2 0.04 GA 84 2 0.02
1980 53 1 0.02 ID 3 0 0.00
1981 66 0 0.00 IL 10 0 0.00
1982 68 1 0.01 IN 4 0 0.00
1983 41 0 0.00 KY 1 0 0.00
1984 26 1 0.04 LA 34 0 0.00
1985 25 0 0.00 MD 1 0 0.00
1986 15 0 0.00 MO 26 1 0.04
1987 6 0 0.00 MS 21 0 0.00
1988 2 0 0.00 MT 4 0 0.00
1989 1 0 0.00 NC 10 0 0.00
. NE 6 0 0.00
NV 4 0 0.00
OK 11 2 0.18
PA 3 0 0.00
SC 7 0 0.00
TN 1 0 0.00
TX 108 9 0.08
UT 3 0 0.00
VA 27 0 0.00
WA 3 0 0.00
WY 2 0 0.0037



















1974 10 1 0.10 AL 256 50 0.20
1975 27 9 0.33 AR 75 9 0.12
1976 45 9 0.20 AZ 189 31 0.16
1977 61 22 0.36 CA 229 26 0.11
1978 77 15 0.19 CO 2 0 0.00
1979 118 23 0.19 CT 2 0 0.00
1980 128 25 0.20 DE 22 0 0.00
1981 161 20 0.12 FL 709 80 0.11
1982 159 16 0.10 GA 269 11 0.04
1983 219 17 0.08 ID 31 11 0.35
1984 238 18 0.08 IL 218 0 0.00
1985 271 27 0.10 IN 67 0 0.00
1986 215 17 0.08 KY 44 13 0.30
1987 246 20 0.08 LA 88 4 0.05
1988 320 30 0.09 MD 42 6 0.14
1989 253 30 0.12 MO 81 6 0.07
1990 238 22 0.09 MS 110 3 0.03
1991 280 28 0.10 MT 13 2 0.15
1992 300 27 0.09 NC 226 6 0.03
1993 258 24 0.09 NE 22 5 0.23
1994 306 26 0.08 NJ 36 3 0.08
1995 234 21 0.09 NM 8 0 0.00
NV 91 17 0.19
OH 104 0 0.00
OK 186 32 0.17
OR 29 4 0.14
PA 178 42 0.24
SC 115 11 0.10
TN 102 13 0.13
TX 495 51 0.10
UT 13 3 0.23
VA 93 4 0.04
WA 15 4 0.27
WY 4 0 0.00